The past has changed. We shall show this by putting together a platitude about truth and the past with a true story you already know.
<@, 1st January 2000>, since the year 1961 precedes the time of this context.
With A-D at hand, we can express our initial platitude as the following semantic principle:
TAP: Truth about past times Let S, c, p, Q, t be such that: S is a temporally specific sentence that is about a past time in context c, p is the proposition expressed by S at c, and Q is the property that p ascribes to the specific time t. Then, S is true in c if and only if t has property Q relative to the past of c.
4
For example, sentence (1) is true in <@, 1st January 2000> because, relative to the past of <@, 1st January 2000>, the year 1961 has the property of being a time in which Obama was born. There is a clear intuition that Frank said something true. Time goes by. Having discovered that Armstrong made use of banned substances, on 22 October 2012 UCI withdraws all of Armstrong's wins at Tour de France. As Frank is not aware of this fact, he utters (2) again at <@, 25th December 2012> (hereafter, Context B). This time, it seems that Frank said something false.
What's the moral of this story? (2) is a temporally specific sentence that is about a past time in both Context A and Context B. Moreover, since (2) does not contain any context-sensitive element -there are no demonstratives, indexicals, gradable adjectives, etc. in it -it expresses the same proposition at both Context A and Context B, namely, (3): 4 It is trivial to see that TAP directly results from a combination of the classical Kaplanian notion of Truth-in-Context (Kaplan 1989) with the referential analysis of tense. If one thinks that the conclusion that the past has changed is too crazy to be true, one will have to impugn one or more of our premises. Which ones? We take it that one cannot but accept that Context A and Context B are located in the same world, and also that sentence (2) is a temporally specific sentence that is about a past time in both contexts. Moreover, TAP is a quite uncontroversial way to capture a pre-theoretical intuition about what it takes for a sentence about a past time to be true. 6 Therefore, if one intends to avoid the conclusion that the past has changed, one will probably have to resist one or the other of the following premises: first, the intuition that (2) is true in Context A and false in Context B; second, the claim that (2) expresses the same proposition at both Context A and Context B. Let's consider these two objections in turn.
3. The objection that (2) has not changed its truth value from Context A to Context B comes in two variants. The first goes like this: Armstrong managed to have the lowest overall time at the Tour de France in 2000 only by doping himself, thus by cheating; but since one cannot be the winner if one cheated, (2) was already false in Context A.
This objection rests on a confusion, by which the property being the winner is conflated with the property being the person who deserves 6 If one favours an operator-based account of tense over a referential analysis, one might argue that TAP is in fact controversial, since it is based on the latter analysis. This objection won't do, since an even more serious puzzle emerges if one adopts an operatorbased account of tense. On the latter, the logical form of (2) is (ii):
(
ii) P(Armstrong wins the Tour de France & it is 2000)
Formula (ii) is true in a context c if and only if 'Armstrong wins the Tour de France & it is 2000' is true relative to c w and a time t < c t (where c w and c t are, respectively, the world and the time of c). This entails that (ii) is true in c if and only if 'Armstrong wins the Tour de France' is true relative to c w and a time t < c t such that t ¼ 2000. Thus, since (ii) is true in Context A, 'Armstrong wins the Tour de France' is true relative to @ and a timeto win. True enough, one cannot enjoy the latter property if one cheated; however, one can enjoy the former even if one cheated, since the possession of the property being the winner is determined solely by a declaration of a competent authority, and a competent authority may, for one reason or another, declare a cheater the winner. Consider, for example, the match between Argentina and England at the FIFA World Cup in 1986. Argentina won the match 2-1. However, the crucial score was achieved through a blatant violation of a rule, as Argentinian player Maradona pushed the ball into the net with his hand. The referee did not see the infraction and validated the score. Thus, even though Argentina cheated, and hence did not deserve to win the match, it was nonetheless the winner, since the competent authority so declared. With this in mind, ask yourself again: was (2) true when uttered in Context A? Needless to say, Armstrong did not deserve to win the Tour de France in 2000. Therefore, (2) would be false in Context A if it ascribed the property being a person who deserves to win the Tour de France in 2000 to Armstrong. However, (2) does not ascribe this property to Armstrong, but rather ascribes the property being the winner of the Tour de France in 2000 to him. Since on 23 July 2000 a competent authority had declared Armstrong the winner, and this declaration was still valid on Christmas 2002, it follows that (2) is true in Context A.
The second variant of the objection has it that (2) is still true after the revocation of Armstrong's titles -hence, still true in Context B. One can try to support this intuition by exploiting the platitude that sincere speakers only assert what they take to be true sentences, and then pointing to cases in which sincere and informed speakers seem to assert (2), or sentences entailing (2), after the revocation of Armstrong's titles. For example, one might consider discourses like the following ones: (Beaver and Condoravdi, 2003) . Thus, since S 1 in (5), i.e., 'The American won seven times straight', contextually entails (2), it might appear safe to conclude that (5) contextually entails (2). These conclusions, however, are flawed. If (4) really entailed its S 1 -component, the addition of sentence (6) to (4) would result in a contradiction, since (6) and the S 1 -component of (4) are logically incompatible:
(6) Armstrong never won any Tour de France in the end.
But the following discourse is perfectly consistent:
(7) Armstrong won the Tour de France seven times from 1999 to 2005. He was later stripped of those titles for doping. So, Armstrong never won any Tour de France in the end.
Therefore, (4) does not entail its S 1 -component. Hence, given that (4) could entail (2) only in virtue of entailing its S 1 -component, it follows that (4) does not entail (2) either. The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to (5). Accordingly, the alleged evidence in support of the intuition that (2) Thus, the strategy of considering assertions made by informed and sincere speakers, rather than supporting the intuition that (2) is true in
Context B, provides evidence in favour of the intuition that (2) is false in that context.
4.
A second way in which one might try to block the conclusion that the past has changed is arguing that the proposition that is false in Context B is not the same as the proposition that is true in Context A. There are two plausible ways to articulate this objection:
Contextualism
The verb phrase 'win the Tour de France in 2000' is a context-sensitive monadic predicate whose content at a context depends on which declaration is relevant in that context.
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Relationalism
The verb phrase 'win the Tour de France in 2000' is an implicitly relational predicate (Condoravdi and Gawron 1996) which, at a certain context, relates a person and a declaration that is relevant in that context.
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On these accounts, (2) is predicted to express proposition (11) 12 More precisely, the content of 'win the Tour de France in 2000' at a context c would be a function from worlds w to sets of individuals i such that i wins the Tour de France in 2000 in w according to the declaration that is relevant in context c.
13 Relationalism naturally follows from the view that the property being the winner of the Tour de France in 2000 is a relational property holding (at a context c) between a person and a declaration (which is valid in c) by a competent authority.
14 Strictly speaking, the two accounts ascribe different logical forms to sentence (2) This difference, however, has no bearing on the point we are making here, since (iii) and (iv) specify the same proposition in any given context -relative to a context c, they specify the proposition that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000 according to the declaration by UCI that is relevant in c.
Contextualism and Relationalism, however, face a major problem. Suppose that, having come to know that Armstrong's titles have been revoked by declaration b, Ms. Blue utters sentence (13) at Context B:
(13) It is no longer the case that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000.
There is a clear intuition that (13) Rather, (14) must be read as presupposing that it was true in the past that Armstrong won-the-Tour-de-France-in-2000-according-to-declaration-b. But this presupposition is false in Context B: since declaration b established the revocation of Armstrong's titles, it has never been the case that, relative to the past of Context B, Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000 according to . Therefore, sentence (13) cannot be true in Context B in virtue of expressing proposition (14) at that context, thus 'win the Tour de France in 2000' is neither a context-sensitive monadic predicate, nor an implicitly relational predicate. Since sentence (2) does not contain any other element which may be plausibly regarded as context-sensitive, it follows that (2) expresses the same proposition at both Context A and Context B.
Conclusion
Without any doubt, there is something puzzling in the conclusion that the past has changed. This conclusion, however, has been shown to follow from a platitude and a true story. One should then stop asking tHE pUZZLE oF tHE cHANGING pAST | 7 whether the past can change and start to inquire on how to make sense of this. We leave this task to a future paper -unless the future changes. 15 University of Sheffield, UK l.barlassina@sheffield.ac.uk CNRS & University of Toulouse II, France fabio.del-prete@univ-tlse2.fr
